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The current economic expansion has seriously challenged a bedrock assumption in economics. It is a widely accepted view that the growth rate of GDP directly affects employment. If it rises, then employment     
rises and the unemployment rate falls. Yet, recently, the United States economy       
has grown stronger without a commensurate growth in employment. Moreover, 
average wages have been weak. The mystery is deepened because, in earlier time 
periods, economic growth in the US was usually accompanied by a higher rate 
of job creation (and higher reduction of unemployment) than in other countries, 
in particular European welfare state countries such as France and Germany. Yet, 
recently we observe that job creation in relation to growth has been falling in the 
US yet rising in Europe. 
To many observers, jobless growth in the US reflects a structural change 
independent of the business cycle. Exactly what drives structural change is 
inevitably not clear. We will summarize current thinking on this subject, but our 
first task is to confirm or reject the contention that job growth has been slow in the 
US. We utilize the basic relationship between unemployment and GDP growth 
postulated by the economist Arthur Okun a generation ago. 
In empirical work, the relationship between output growth and job creation 
has been widely studied based on what is known as Okun’s law. This paper 
attempts to relate the recent discussion on jobless recovery, observed in the US 
economy since the 1990s, to the empirical studies on Okun’s law, which postulates 
a specific empirical relationship between economic growth and the change in the 
rate of unemployment. Our general hypothesis is that if the Okun coefficient for 
the economy has weakened, it explains the jobless recovery. Our results indeed 
show a decline in the time-varying Okun coefficient for the US since the early 
1990s, which coincides with the weak job recovery starting from the 1991 trough. 
By contrast, in many other countries, Okun’s coefficient is rising. 
This Policy Note is organized as follows: section 2 briefly outlines Okun’s 
law and the concomitant Okun’s coefficient. Section 3 establishes empirically the 
existence of a jobless recovery in the US in recent years. In section 4 a brief review 
of explanations for the jobless recovery is given in the context of the research on 
Okun’s law. Section 5 concludes with policy implications. 
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2] OKUN’S LAW
As is noted above, it is a widely accepted 
view in economics that the growth rate of the GDP 
of an economy increases employment and reduces 
unemployment. For Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom the growth rate of GDP from 
the 1960s to the middle of 1970s was roughly 3.5 
percent and the unemployment rates fell to a range 
of roughly 3–4 percent. The United States over 
this period experienced a lower growth rate and a 
higher unemployment rate of about 6–7 percent. 
But from the beginning of the 1980s to the current 
time period, the growth rate of Germany and France 
has been on average about or below 2 percent. 
Their unemployment rate has risen to 8–9 percent. 
In contrast, the US growth rate has moved up to 
roughly 3.5 percent on average since the 1990s, 
and the unemployment rate has moved down to 
roughly 5 percent on average. So economists and 
politicians alike agree: economic growth is good for 
employment.
Some forty years ago Okun (1962) 
summarized the relationship of growth and 
unemployment in a statistical relationship, which 
was later labeled Okun’s law. It has been discussed 
and updated by much economic research. This 
law states that the relationship of growth to 
unemployment reduction (employment increase) is 
not one to one. Okun in 1962 postulated that there 
is only a weak relationship between growth and the 
reduction of unemployment. He postulated that a 
1 percent increase in the growth rate above the 
trend rate of growth (or the growth in potential 
output) would lead only to 0.3 percent in the 
reduction of unemployment. Reversing the causality, 
a 1 percent increase in unemployment will mean 
roughly more than 3 percent loss in GDP growth. 
This relationship implies that the rate of GDP 
growth must be equal to its potential growth just to 
keep the unemployment rate constant. To reduce 
unemployment, therefore, the rate of GDP growth 
must be above the growth rate of potential output. 
We have updated Okun’s results with a recent 
data set (1961–2000). Table 1 summarizes the 
estimated results for Okun’s coefficient. The results 
are based on the estimation of the difference version 
of Okun’s law.1 Output is measured by GDP volume 
at constant prices and quarterly data are used. 
As Table 1 shows, in the US, the response of 
unemployment to an increase in the growth rate of 
the GDP has been, for a long time period, higher 
than in other countries. For the time period 1961–
2000, roughly a 1 percent growth rate has led to a 
decline in the unemployment rate by 0.37 percent. 
1. ��ere are typically t��o speci�
fications of Okun‘s relation�
ship. First, there is the gap     
model takes the follo��ing form: 
* *( )t t t t ty y u uβ ε− = − − +
��hereby ty  is actual output; 
*
ty  is some measure of potential 
output; tu is unemployment 
rate; *tu  is the natural rate of 
unemployment; and β  is the 
Okun coefficient. ��e error term   
is given by tε . �econd, there is 
the difference model is given by 
0 1t t ty uβ β ε∆ = − ∆ + . Here 
again ty  is actual output and 
tu  the unemployment rate. ��e 
last specification can be reversed 
by interchanging the gro��th rate 
of u and of y. ��e estimated beta 
coefficient ��ill then be called the 
Okun coefficient. ��e data source 
for our estimation is the Interna-
tional Statistical Yearbook.
Country
Okun 
Coefficient
Potential 
output growth R Sample ga
France (3.12) 0.041 0.226 1961–01 0.037
Germany (5.672) 0.041 0.479 1961–00 0.03
UK (4.358) 0.026 0.352 1961–00 0.025
US (9.832) 0.033 0.734 1961–00 0.035
Table 1: 
Estimates of Okun’s 
Law
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In Germany, for the same time period, the effect 
of a 1 percent growth rate on unemployment is on 
average only 0.22 and for France it is 0.17 percent. 
For the UK, interestingly, we obtain 0.31 percent, 
comparable to the US coefficient. The last column in 
Table 1 shows the average growth rate over the time 
period considered. There have been many empirical 
papers on Okun’s law that show similar results. See, 
for example, Lee (2000). Yet overall, it is also clear 
according to the academic research that Okun’s 
law is not necessarily very stable over different time 
periods, employment data sets and methods of 
estimation.2
3] cHANGE Of OKUN’S LAW AND JOBLESS GROWTH 
Our recent research on Okun’s law (see 
Semmler and Zhang 2005) demonstrates that there 
appears to be a structural change in the relationship 
linking growth to unemployment reduction 
(employment increase) for major countries, 
including the United States. For some countries the 
response of employment to economic growth has 
increased, while for the US it has declined. Figure 
1 (solid line) reports empirical results for France, 
Germany, the UK, and the US. The figure shows the 
time–varying reaction of unemployment to growth 
rates (as deviations from the mean). For France and 
the UK the response has increased, as compared to 
their mean, since the beginning of the 1990s. For 
Germany it first went down at the beginning of 
the 1990s—probably owing to the unification of 
Germany in 1991 and the large exogenous increase 
in labor supply. But it has increased since the middle 
of the 1990s. However, for the US, Figure 1 shows 
that the response of unemployment to growth rates 
steadily moved down since the beginning of the 
1990s. The US case clearly shows a decline of the 
response of employment to economic growth—thus, 
a jobless recovery, as some have called it. 
We then compare the job growth since the 
last trough to previous business cycles upswings. A 
paper by Groshen and Potter (2003) summarized 
the recent US trends in an interesting graph. We 
have expanded this analysis to capture more months 
after the trough of the recession. Figure 2 graphs 
the percentage deviation of each observation (twelve 
months before and forty–five months after the 
trough) from the payroll number that existed at the 
trough. The figure shows that payroll job growth just 
after the trough increased quickly for past recessions. 
This is not seen to be the case for the last trough 
(November 2001). The first monthly payroll number 
that exceeds the trough number occurs in the 29th 
2. �ee �2����� produces perhaps    
the most comprehensive study 
on Okun’s la�� in terms of the 
number of countries, model 
specification, and econometric 
technique. �i�teen O�CD coun�  
tries ��ere included and both the 
gap model and the difference 
model ��ere estimated. For the 
gap model, three methods ��ere 
used to e�tract the trend—the 
Kalman filter, the HP filter and 
the B� filter. ��e first�difference 
model ��as also modified to take 
into consideration cointegra�
tion bet��een unemployment 
and gro��th. He also tested for 
asymmetric response of gro��th 
and unemployment at different 
moments of the business cycle. 
Figure 1: 
Time-Varying Okun 
Coefficient
France
	1965	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995	 2000
Germany
	1965	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995	 2000
UK
	1965	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995	 2000
US
	1965	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995	 2000
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month after the official end of the recession. For the 
1991 trough, this occurred by the 13th month. For 
the average of past cycles, there was an immediate 
pick-up in the payroll numbers. Overall, Figure 2 
shows only a slim growth in payroll jobs since 2001.
To complete the picture we add another graph 
to show how each quarter of real GDP growth—
three quarters before the trough and fourteen 
quarters after—deviates in percentage terms from the 
position of the trough. This is presented by Figure 3.      
The chart shows that the pick–up of real GDP was in 
fact significantly weaker than that of the average of 
past recoveries. However, it tracks the 1991 recovery 
fairly closely until the fourth quarter. The similarity 
ends between the fourth and the eighth quarters, 
but then once again resumes. Thus, the lower than  
average output growth would itself explain part of 
the slower payroll employment recovery, but not all 
of it.
 4] SOmE SUGGESTivE iNTERpRETATiONS
Several hypotheses have been proposed 
to explain the very mild job recovery and, by 
implication, the reduction of the Okun coefficient. 
An interesting development of the recent recovery 
versus past recoveries is the relatively rapid rise of 
productivity. This fact is documented in Figure 4,  
which summarizes productivity changes during 
recessions. We calculate the percentage deviation 
of quarterly productivity numbers from that which 
existed at the trough. The recent productivity 
increase shoots above the average of previous 
recessions after seven quarters. After six quarters the 
recent productivity increase did the same vis–a–vis 
the 1991 recession. This behavior might help to 
explain—even though we do not ascribe a causal role 
to productivity growth because this variable itself is 
driven by several factors—why the job recovery has 
been so slow. By definition labor productivity rises 
when there are factors that suppress employment 
growth while output is expanding.
It is possible that there was a change in the 
trend of productivity since the 1990s. Of course 
such productivity trends are hard to measure. There 
is a long tradition in economics that presumes 
that productivity increases—and the change in 
productivity trends—may not create employment in 
the short run. If prices are sticky in the short run and 
demand is constrained, then productivity will not 
significantly increase employment for the economy as 
a whole. In fact there may be no employment effects 
(see Francis and Ramey 2003; Gong and Semmler 
2006). Productivity increases are advantages for an 
Figure 2: 
US Payroll Job Growth 
During Recoveries
Note:
The average cycles of business cycles with troughs in February 1961, November 1970, 
March 1975, July 1980, and November 1982.
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Figure 3: 
Change in US Real GDP 
During Recoveries
Note:
The average cycles of business cycles with troughs in February 1961, November 1970, 
March 1975, July 1980, and November 1982.
economy, but such advantages might only work out 
in the long run. In the short run employment might 
not increase and unemployment might not decrease.
The growth in productivity might also reflect 
the desire of firms to retrench workers in order 
to minimize costs. There are two versions of this 
hypothesis. The first emphasizes the rapid growth in 
health care costs in recent years, which might raise 
costs above equilibrium. The second emphasizes the 
role of fixed employment costs per worker that do 
not vary with hours worked. To avoid high fixed 
costs, employers cut back on permanent hires and 
require existing employees to work longer hours. But 
this explanation can be counteracted by the fact that 
employers can reduce other costs such as wages and 
salaries. Therefore, these costs do not necessarily have 
to contribute to slow job recovery once the employer 
can shift them away from other expenses.
Another explanation for the jobless recovery 
is structural change (or structural unemployment)—
unemployment not associated with the business 
cycle. This was hypothesized some time ago by       
Aghion and Howitt (1994) and empirically studied 
by Groshen and Potter (2003). Upon analyzing 
industry–level employment data, Groshen and 
Potter (2003) suggested that the latest upswing since 
2001 occurred while the US economy underwent 
significant structural change. They claimed that a 
significant percentage of layoffs can be attributed to 
permanent rather than temporary layoffs. Permanent 
layoffs are a feature of structural unemployment 
as industries disappear. They explained that 
symptomatic of structural change are industries that 
continue to lose jobs after having lost jobs during the 
last recession or industries that continue to gain jobs 
after having gained jobs during the last recession. 
Exactly what is driving the structural change, 
however, is not clearly established. One explanation 
might be the relative position of the US in the 
international economy. Indeed, Bernanke (2003) 
suggested trade might be a factor that accounts 
for the change. Americans, he noted, have a high 
propensity to consume foreign manufactured 
goods relative to the Unites States’ ability to sell its 
manufactured goods abroad. For him, though, the 
explanation of structural change might be due to 
macroeconomic factors—namely the US current 
account deficit—rather than microeconomic or 
labor market factors. The persistence of the current 
account deficit is the result of both weaknesses and 
strengths of the US economy. The weakness includes 
the low national savings rate, which forces us to 
finance consumption (both private and government) 
by importing more than we export. However, the 
deficit also reflects the attractiveness of the US 
economy to foreign investors, which is itself due 
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to the rapid growth of the US relative to trading 
partners. 
Freeman and Rodgers (2005) have also 
alluded to the US performance in the international 
economy as a potential candidate to explain the 
slowdown of job growth. They have noted a 
substantial drop of FDI inflows into the US with the 
figure declining from 1.6 percent of GDP in 2001 to 
0.3 percent of GDP in 2003. 
The growing use of just-in-time hiring (see 
Schreft and Singh, 2003) is proposed as a further 
possible explanation for the weak job recovery. This 
practice involves the employment of temporary 
and part-time workers and also the use of overtime 
to achieve a more flexible workforce. Employers 
are likely to use just-in-time hiring when there is 
uncertainty about the future, especially when the 
strength of the recovery is uncertain. While such 
practices could be widespread at the initial stages 
of the recovery, it is not so certain that it should 
persist for many months after the trough. Yet it has. 
As Figure 2 shows, this recovery has been markedly 
weaker than past recoveries despite the relatively 
strong showing of GDP growth. 
Overall, in the US, the potential output and 
potential GDP growth rate seem to have gone up, 
whereas in the Euro-area countries the potential 
output and potential growth rate appear to have 
gone down. This, at least, holds since the middle of 
the 1980s, as the preliminary results of the paper 
by Semmler and Zhang (2005) show. As to Europe, 
the reasons for this may include the following: weak 
demand resulting from restricted monetary and 
fiscal policies, lack of technological innovations, less 
over-valuation of business firms in the stock market, 
and so on. If there is a shift in the potential output 
and potential GDP growth rate, Okun’s law will not 
show a stable relationship any more and we would 
expect a changing relationship between growth and 
employment.
When there is stronger structural change, 
as observable in the last decade and as discussed 
above, labor market search and matching institutions 
become important in helping to match the supply 
of vacancies to the demand for labor through job 
searches by the unemployed. (Other labor market 
institutions, such as the type and length of labor 
contracts, are also important, see also Okun 1962.) 
It has been argued that, in particular for Euro-area 
countries in earlier times, labor market institutions 
have not been flexible enough. As the data shows, 
vacancies were still fluctuating but the Beveridge 
curve (defining the relationship between vacancies 
and unemployed) shifted to the right, to a higher 
level of unemployment. Yet, as can be seen from 
Figure 1, for some EU countries, the matching of 
Figure 4: 
Change in US Non Farm 
Productivity During 
Recoveries (Output Per 
Hour)
Note:
The average cycles of business cycles with troughs in February 1961, November 1970, 
March 1975, July 1980, and November 1982.
-20.00
-10.00
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
 -4 -3 -2 -1 Trough 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Average Recession
1991 Recession
2001 Recession
Quarters before and after
Source: Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
ch
an
ge

vacancies and job searches by the unemployed seems 
to have improved—due to labor market reforms—
and GDP growth appears to add more workers to 
the payroll of firms. This can be read as an indication 
that at least matching has improved in Euro-area 
countries, and it helps explain the improved Okun 
coefficient.
Finally, it might be interesting to pursue 
whether the change of the GDP growth rate on 
unemployment (and employment) might be skill-
biased—in the sense that it affects low skilled labor 
more than high skilled labor. This is also relevant 
in regard to the differential effects of growth rates 
on unemployment and employment. In fact as 
empirical research has shown—see Greiner, Rubart, 
and Semmler (2004)—there is less inequality in EU-
countries than in the US and a differential impact 
of growth on employment of different skill groups 
may exacerbate the existing inequality in the US. As 
Howell, Madrick, and Mahoney (2005) have shown, 
although some jobs in the US have been created since 
the last recession, these are jobs at the lower end of 
the skill ladder. 
5] pOLicy impLicATiONS AND cONcLUSiONS
In this paper we interpret the recent 
phenomenon of jobless growth in the US in terms 
of Okun’s theory. We demonstrate in Figure 1 that 
a declining response of job growth stems from a 
decline in the Okun coefficient. We also show that, in 
other countries—for example Germany and France, 
this coefficient has not been falling but rising. The 
previous higher response of job growth to economic 
growth in the US has thus been reversed. 
Concerning the US, we should stress that 
there are many links in the chain of causality that we 
do not understand. Still, what we do know is that 
governments must provide some security against 
disasters, such as those arising from natural disasters, 
health shocks, joblessness, and unemployment. 
The large structural change in the last decade 
suggests such a need for government. Relocating of 
jobs cannot be achieved solely by re-education and 
re-skilling of the labor force or by better labor market 
search and matching institutions. The unemployed 
need decent income and health care during such 
periods. The low levels of unemployment benefits and 
the short duration of unemployment payment in the 
US—as compared to the European welfare States—
make unemployment a more difficult experience than 
is justified. As Robert Reich, the labor secretary in the 
Clinton administration recently argued, higher levels 
of unemployment benefits—and for a longer time 
period—are essential as precautionary measure against 
structural and cyclical unemployment. 
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